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Callis: Copyright Protection

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN
FACTUAL COMPILATIONS:
FEIST PUBLICATIONS v. RURAL
TELEPHONE SERVICE COMPANY
"ALTRUISM EXPRESSED IN
COPYRIGHT LAW"
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution grants Congress the power to create copyright laws. 1 This grant contains inherent tensions between
protecting the author's fruits of labor and providing the public with access to copyrighted works. 2 Copyright law reflects
these tensions.
Until recently two competing theories about what copyright
protection is available to factual compilations split the circuit
courts of appeal. The Copyright Act defines a compilation as "a
work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged
in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes
an original work of authorship."3 Fact-based compilations
involve factual preexisting materials or data.·
The two theories which split the circuit courts of appeal
over copyright protection available to fact-based compilations are the "sweat of the brow" theory, previously followed
In three circuits,6 and the "selection, arrangement, or
1. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See infra p. 531.
2.Id.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
4. Traditional examples offactual works include maps, charts, telephone books,
photographs, and business forms. Davidson, Sympo8ium: The Future of Software
Protection: Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PI'M'. L. REV. 1037, 1103 (1986).
5. The circuits following the ·sweat of the brow· theory were the Seventh,
Eighth and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines &; Co., 905 F.2d
1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, _ U.S. _ , 111 S. Ct. 1408 (vacating
judgment and remanding for reconsideration in light of Feist), on remand, 932 F.2d
610 (7th Cir. 1991) (remanding for entry of judgment against plaintitTin light of Fei8t);
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985); Feist
Publications v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 916 F.2d 718 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. granted,_
U.S. _ , 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (reversing judgment against defendant).
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coordination" theory8 previously followed in four circuits. 7 In
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service CO.,8 the Supreme
Court clarified the law. The Court rejected the "sweat of the
brow" theory which rewarded the labor required to produce a
work with copyright protection. 9 Instead, the Court stated
that copyright protection extends only to the "manner in which
the collected facts have been selected, coordinated, and
arranged. "10 The Court noted that the 1976 Copyright Act
makes it clear that copyright requires originality, II facts are not
original,12 and that therefore copyright does not necessarily
extend to facts contained in a compilation. IS
In the wake of Feist, copyright practitioners are scrambling
to determine what it all means, and how best to protect their
client's intellectual property rights and interests. 14 While different views are presented, an expression of dismay is common. 16 This note will address the question: are the copyright
practitioners justified in their concern? Part I will outline the
6. Hereinafter "selection· theory.
7. The circuits following the selection theory were the Second, Fifth, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investment Serv.,
751 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1984),808 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 820 (1987); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365,1369-70 (5th Cir.
1981); Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory
Pub., 756 F.2d 801, 809 (11th Cir. 1985).
8. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) [hereinafter Feist].
9. Id. at 1291.
10. Id. at 1294.
11. Id. at 1295. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) states in part: "Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... •
12'. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) states in part: "In no case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.·
13. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) states: "The copyright in a compilation or
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work,
as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not
imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownerShip, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.·
14. See Beck, Two Views on the Implications of Feist v. Rural Telephone:
Copyright Protection for Compilations and Databases after Feist, 8 THE COMPUTER LAw.,
July 1991, at 1; Bartz, Two Views on the Implications of Feist v. Rural Telephone: The
Beginning of the End of Software Overprotection', 8 THE COMPUTER LAw., July 1991,
at 10; Abramson, High Court Ruling Means New Rules for Compilers, DIRECT
MARKETING NEWS, Apr. 29, 1991, at 54 (NEXIS, OMNI library).
15. See, e.g.• Beck. supra note 14, at 1; Bartz. supra note 14. at 10; Abramson,
supra note 14, at 54.
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Constitutional underpinnings of copyright protection. More
specifically, this Part will discuss the two theories underlying
the case law in the circuit courts of appeal, including a discussion of their legal philosophies. Part II will examine the
Court's decision in Feist. Part III will analyze and critique the
Court's decision, discuss practical implications, and present
various alternate protections for databases. Finally, this note
will conclude that there is little cause for concern, and the interests of copyright practitioners must properly yield to the
Court's expression of the altruistic principles inherent in copyright law.
I. THE INHERENT TENSIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW

Copyright law represents a compromise between social
policies. 16 The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries. "17 Within this
grant lies an inherent tension between affording protection to
the individual author, and providing the general public with
access to information. IS
One social policy favors wide dissemination of ideas. 19 This
competes with another policy giving writers and artists a fair
economic reward by means of a monopoly over their works. 20
One apparent result of these competing policies has been the
concurrent development oflegal theory promoting the policy of
incentive to authors ("sweat of the brow" theory), and a legal
theory promoting the policy of wide dissemination and use of
ideas ("selection" theory).
A.

THE "SWEAT OF THE BROW" THEORY: PROMOTING THE SOCIAL
POLICY FAVORING ECONOMIC REWARD TO WRITERS

The "sweat of the brow" theory evolved from John Locke's
natural law theory.21 Locke's theory posited that one has a
16. See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the
Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 519 n.11 (1981).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. Denicola, supra note 16, at 519.
19. 1d.
20.1d.
21. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT para. 27, at 17 (T. Peardon
rev. ed. 1952) (1st ed. 1690).
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property interest in one's body, and therefore in the work of
one's body.22
The idea that this property interest is copyrightable was
best embodied by the case law in Jeweler's Circular Publishing
Co. v. Keystone Publishing CO.,23 the seminal case describing the
"sweat of the brow" theory. There, quoting Kelly v. Morris, 24 the
Jeweler's Circular court noted that the defendant was mistaken
in arguing that copyright did not protect the exertion oflabor
required to collect facts. The Jeweler's Circular court stated
that so long as labor is expended in the preparation of a work,
copyright protection is available. 25
B.

THE "SELECTION" THEORY: PROMOTING THE SOCIAL POLICY
FAVORING WIDE DISSEMINATION OF IDEAS

Recall that the two competing interests inherent in copyright are economic incentives promoting authorship, and limits on copyright availability promoting wide dissemination or
sharing of ideas. It is widely accepted that economic incentives
are neccessary so authors will continue to create works and disseminate them to the public. This has been described as copyright's "core" doctrine. 26
Recent theorists have recognized that the economic incentive of copyright protection can work against authors "sharing"
works in the interest of promoting the progress of arts and sciences. 27 One theorist28 posits that the natural law theory, relied
on in Jeweler's Circular and ot.her cases establishing a copyrightable property interest in one's labor, is misguided.
According to Alfred Yen, original natural law partook of a
moral character which was later replaced by economic
efficiency.29
22. Id.
23. 281 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1922) cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922) [hereinafter
Jeweler's Circular].
24. 1 Law Rptr. Equity 697 (1866).
25. Jeweler's Circular, 281 F. at 88. The "sweat of the brow" theory is variously known as the "industrious collection" theory.Id.
26. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the B~tamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1619 (1982).
27. See, e.g., Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 517 n,l (arguing for the restoration of our "natural law heritage"
which recognizes both economic and moral values in copyright).
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Another theorist has recently challenged the basic assumption that economic incentives are necessary to motivate authors
to produce works. 30 Linda Lacey argues that a fundamental flaw
of copyright law assumes all artists are primarily motivated by
economics. 31 She asserts that in reality, artists 32 are motivated by a variety of interests. 33 One can reason that if authors are
motivated to create works by more than mere economics, eliminating the economic incentive will not necessarily spell the end
of intellectual property production.
Wide availability of copyrighted works is generally regarded to be in the "public interest."34 Lacey disputes the commonly used meaning of "public interest." She acknowledges that
"[c]ontemporary liberal theory regards the 'public' as a
Hobbesian collection of autonomous individuals, each acting out
of self interest. "36 However, Lacey asserts that:
[the] 'public' also can be understood as an
interdependent community with certain
common interests that affect all its members ... even individuals who are not direct
recipients of artistic work benefit from its
availability to society, just as free public
education does more for a community than
30. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989:2 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1571
(1989).
31. Id. Lacey admits that "[o)fcourse, a significant number of people indeed do
create exclusively to make money ... [b)ut the assumption that the financial motive is
universal is simply incorrect and should not continue to be the exclusive foundation
of copyright law." Id. at 1574.
32. Although Lacey primarily discusses "artists" in her article, her theory is equally applicable to all authors of copyrighted works. Lacey uses the term '''artist' ... in its
broadest sense to include writers, sculptors, choreographers, etc.--anyone who creates
a product that can be protected by copyright law."Id. at 1532 n.3. Further, she notes
that "[a]ll intellectual property can be categorized roughly as work that has either political, educational, aesthetic, or entertainment value, or as work that has value in several of these contexts." Id. at 1588.
33. Lacey notes that even among successful writers, economic gain was "their least
popular reason to write." Id. at 1574 n.195 (citing P.E.N. International, News Release
(undated) (file on copy in journal office), at 4).
34. Id. at 1584. For this proposition Lacey cites, e.g., 3 M. & D. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A], at 13-72; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1601 (1982); Sinclair, Fair Use Old and New: The Betamax Case and its
Forebears, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 269, 291-92 (1984); Walker, Fair Use: The Adjustable
Tool for Maintaining Copyright Equilibrium, 43 LA. L. REv. 735, 754 (l983).Id. at 1584
n.229.
35. Id. at 1584-85 (citing T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63-66, 104-10 (Everyman's
Library ed. 1983».
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serving the individual needs of parents of
school age children. "86
One can reason that if the public interest entails shared community interests rather than "the autonomous interests of a
large number of people,"87 "Progress of Science and useful
Arts"88 results when the community at large can reap the benefits of authors building on other's works without having to
reinvent the wheel. To serve this "public interest," less copyright protection is necessary.
The "selection" theory can be seen as recognizing a need to
reestablish the public's interest in copyright. This can be
viewed as a shift in emphasis from individualism to altruism. 89 Individualism is described as self-interest and self
reliance,4o while altruism is defined as a belief that one's own
interest should not necessarily be preferred over the interests
of others. 41
According to Duncan Kennedy, individualist and altruistic
principles pervade our entire legal system, creating "flatly
contradictory visions of the universe."42 The simultaneous
existence of individualism and altruism causes legal theorists, lawyers, and judges to examine the true interaction
between law and society.48 The juxtaposition of these two
36. Id. at 1585.
37. Id. at 1596.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39. Lacey, supra note 30, at 1533.
40. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1685, 1713 (1976).
41. Id.atl717.
42. Id. at 1776.
43. Kennedy describes a transition "from Classical to modern legal
thought ... through the imagery of core and periphery." The "core" was:
equated with firm adherence to autonomy, facilitation and selfdetermination. The existence of countertendencies was acknowledged, but in a backhanded way. By its "very nature," freedom
must have limits; these could be derived as implications from that
nature; and they would then constitute the periphery of exceptions to the core doctrines (emphasis in original)."
Id. at 1737. In Kennedy's view, today we recognize both the "core" and the "periphery,"
because both exist in the law and its relation to reality. Kennedy asserts:
What distinguishes the modern situation is the breakdown
of the conceptual boundary between the core and the
periphery, so that all the conflicting positions are at least
potentially relevant to all issues. The Classical concepts
oriented us to one ethos or the other -- to core or periphery
-- and then permitted consistent argument within that point
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seemingly contradictory principles creates tension in the law. 44
This tension results in the generation of new ideas, or a synthesis of the old into a new vision. 4s Similarly, Lacey's definition of the public interest includes a communal aspect. This is
an altruistic notion. Her revelation that multiple motivations
inspire authors accompanies her scrutiny of copyright's inherent tensions. This examination of the interaction between law
and society leads to a new vision of copyright. 46 In this context
the "selection" theory is the new vision, better serving the
author's and community's needs. Therefore, one can approve
the Supreme Court's embrace of the "selection" theory as a welcome attempt to enforce, at the highest level, the altruistic
principles inherent in copyright law.
THE COURT'S DECISION IN FEIST
A.

THE FACTS OF FEIST

Feist concerned the unprivileged use of information contained in a white pages directory published by Rural Telephone
CompanyY Rural Telephone Company had published the directory as part of its mandate as a public utility. 48
of view, with a few hard cases occurring at the borderline.
Now, each of the conflicting visions claims universal
relevance, but is unable to establish hegemony anywhere.
1d.

44. Kennedy describes this tension as "the sticking points of the two sides--the
moments at which the individualist, in his movement towards the state of nature, suddenly reverses himself and becomes an altruist, and the symmetrical moment at
which the altruist becomes an advocate of rules and self-reliance rather than slide all
the way to total collectivism or anarchism.· Id. at 1767.
45. Kennedy gives the example of a judge in a contract dispute faced with following precedent or recognizing the injustice such slavish rule following would work:
"there is value as well as an element oCreal nobility in the judicial decision to throw
out, every time the opportunity arises, consumer contracts designed to perpetuate the
exploitation of the poorest class of buyers on credit. Real people are involved, even if
there are not very many whose lives the decision can affect.· 1d. at 1777.
46. Indeed, Lacey's new vision reaches beyond copyright to property law in general. Lacey argues that limited ownership logically should not extend only to intellectual property:
The spirit of altruism that permeates the language of copyright theory is indeed moving. But until we apply that selfless spirit and those persuasive reasons why intellectual
property must be shared with the community to other forms
of property, we are being hypocritical at the expense of the
artist and society. The anthem of the striking women textile
workers, which has become a feminist rallying cry, is right:
We must have both bread and roses-one without the other
never will be enough.
Lacey, supra note 30, at 1596.
47. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1286.
48.1d.
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Feist Publications, an independent publisher, began to
publish white and yellow pages directories,49 The white page
directories were organized into separate geographic areas. 50 The
yellow pages were similarly organized and marketed to
geographic areas corresponding to those in the white pages. 61
In order to obtain the white pages information, Feist
Publications entered into licensing agreements with all utilities except Rural Telephone Company who declined to enter into
such an agreement. 62
In an effort to obtain the necessary listings, Feist
Publications extracted the information from Rural Telephone
Company's directory.63 Rural Telephone Company had suspected Feist Publications of extracting information from its
directory, and therefore had included several fictitious listings. 54
When Feist Publications published its directory, 1,309 of its
46,878 listings were identical to those contained in Rural
Telephone Company's directory, including four fictitious
listings;66
Rural Telephone Company sued Feist Publications for
copyright infringement in the District Court for the District of
Kansas. 66 Rural Telephone Company asserted that Feist
Publications was obliged to separately canvass for the information contained in its directory.67 Feist Publications countered
that Rural Telephone Company's directory was outside the
protection of copyright,68 and alternatively defended on
antitrust grounds. 69 The district court determined that antitrust
was not a defense to copyright, and severed that issue from the
case. 60 The district court then found that Feist Publications had
infringed Rural Telephone Company's copyright. 61 Feist
Publications appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
49.1d.
50.1d.
51. 1d.
52.1d.
53.1d.
54. Rural Tel. Servo CO. V. Feist Publications, 663 F. Supp. 214, 217 (D. Kan. 1987)
[hereinafter Rural].
55. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287.
56. Rural, 663 F. Supp. at 216.
57. Feist, III S. Ct. at 1287.
58. Rural, 663 F. Supp. at 217.
59. 1d. at 216.
60.1d.
61. 1d. at 220.
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Circuit affirmed,62 without opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of copyright. 53
B.

ORIGINALITY: "THE SINE QUA NON OF COPYRIGHT"64

In Feist, the Supreme Court noted that The Trade-Mark
Cases 65 addressed the scope of the Constitutional source of
Congressional power to "secur[e] for limited Times to
Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings."66
There, the Supreme Court determined that originality is
Constitutionally required in order for a work to qualify as the
writing of an author.67 The Court stated that "[t]he writings
which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor,
embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like."66
In Feist, the Court concluded that the touchstone of copyright protection is the originality requirement articulated in
The Trade-Mark Cases. 69 As applied to factual compilations, the
Court held that the basis for originality lies in choosing facts·
for inclusion, as well as ordering and arranging them in a
useful fashion. 70 The Court further stated that so long as such
compilations are independently assembled and contain minimal creativity, they are protected by copyright.71
C.
ORIGINALITY IN FACTUAL COMPILATIONS STATUTORILY
REQUIRES SELECTION AND ARRANGEMENT, NOT "SWEAT OF THE
BROW"72

In Feist, the Supreme Court cited its decision in
International News Service v. Associated Press 7S for the proposition that the copyright statute does "not permit the 'sweat of
the brow' approach."7. Although the Court in International
News noted that the 1909 Copyright Act included newspapers among copyrightable materials, the idea that copyright
62. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1989).
63. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1286.

64. Id. at 1287.
65. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
66. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
67. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
68.Id.
69. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288.
70. Id. at 1289.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1292.
73. 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter International News].
74. Feist, 111 S.Ct. at 1292.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 13

538

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:529

extended to facts contained in an article was completely rejected. 75 There, the Court held that the information forming the news
reported in newspapers is not an original creation but rather a
report of information 'rightfully belonging to the public. 76
Further, the Court noted that historically copyright law has
comprehended a distinction between the necessity for disseminating factual works and the necessity for disseminating
fictional works. 77 Therefore copyright in factual works is necessarily "thin"78 since copyright may only extend to the author's
artistic expression, and not to the facts expressed.
The Court looked to the legislative histories of all the copyright acts for further support for its interpretation of the originality requirement. The Court noted that Congress
incorporated the Register's advice contained in the Report of
the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law. 79 The report suggested that the originality
requirement be explicit in order to clear up "misconceptions as
to what is copyrightable matter. "80
The Court acknowledged that after the 1976 revisions to the
Copyright Act, the touchstone of copyright protection in factbased compilations was originality and not "sweat of the
brow. "81 The Court summarized the Congressional responses to
confusion in this area. 82 The Court concluded that copyright
revisions clearly explain that copyright requires originality,83
facts are not original,8' copyright does not extend to the facts
75. ld. (quoting International News, 248 U.S. at 234).
76.ld.
77. ld. (quoting Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985».
78. When an author recounts historical facts, copyright extends only to his
"subjective descriptions," and if there are none, copyright is only available to "[t]he
only conceivable expression ... the manner in which the compiler has selected and
arranged the facts." ld. at 1289.
79. ld. at 1292.
80. ld. (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LAw 9 (Comm: Print 1961».
81. ld. at 1295.
82.ld.
83. ld. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) states, in part: "Copyright protection subsists,
in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fiXed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."
84. ld. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) states: "In no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
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contained in a compilation,86 and that copyright :protection
available to a compilation extends only to original selection,
coordination, or arrangement. 86

D.

THE ORIGINALITY REQUIREMENT AFTER FEIST

The Court explained that the key to originality lies in the
"manner in which the collected facts have been selected, coordinated, and arranged."87 The Court suggests that a mechanical or routine manner of selection, coordination or arrangement
may not meet the low standard of originality.88 Further, the
Court notes that the originality standard is not met in arrangements which are obvious, common place, expedient, traditional, or inevitable. 89
The Court determined that Rural Telephone Company's
arrangement of its white pages was "entirely typical," and
"could not be more obvious. "90 Additionally, the Court hinted in
dicta that Rural Telephone Company did not engage in any
selection process whatsoever, but rather that, by virtue of its
monopoly franchise, it "selected" included information based
on a mandate by the Kansas Corporation Commission. 91
Finally, the Court noted that constitutionally, copyright
anticipates that some works will fail to achieve originality, and
that if Rural Telephone Company's alphabetized list of subscribers is deemed "original," then all works are origina1. 92
The Court stated that to warrant copyright protection, a work's
creative spark must be more than de minimis. 93 The Court
85. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) states: "The copyright in a compilation or
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work,
as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not
imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material."
86. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) states, in part: "A 'compilation' is a work formed
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes
an original work of authorship. The term 'compilation' includes collective works."
87. Id. at 1294.
88. Id. at 1296.
89.Id.
90.Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1297.
93. [d.
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found that Rural Telephone Company's white pages unquestionably did not meet this low standard. 9'
III. CRITIQUE: WHY THE COURT'S DECISION WAS
CORRECT
The Court's decision in Feist was supported by prior case
law in the majority of the circuits,96 the plain language of the
copyright statute,98 the purpose of the Constitutional grant to
Congress,97 and the original moral meaning embodied in the
notion of natu'ral law9s as well as the altruistic principles
which underlie our jurisprudence in general. 99 Some theorists
have posited that the lack oflegal debate regarding the duration of copyright protection can be seen as a rejection of the
"natural law, fruit-of-the-creators-Iabor theory.... "100
The Court's decision was narrow: to the extent Rural
Telephone Company was not found to have satisfied originality in its selection, its status as a public utility arguably
played a part. IOI This means Feist's decision could be limited to
instances involving public utilities or other situations where
selection is pre-determined by mandate.
The Court seemed to implicate Rural Telepone's Company
standing as a public utility as an issue when it hinted in dicta
that Rural Telephone Company did not voluntarily engage in
any selection process, but rather made its selections based on
requirements dictated by the Kansas Corporation Commission.
94.Id.
95. More circuits previously followed the "selection" heory than the "sweat of the
brow· theory. See, e.g., Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205
(9th Cir. 1989) on remand 1991 W.L. 138317 (only selection, coordination and arrangement were protectable, blank forms were not); Harper &: Row v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 548 (1985) [hereinafter Harper & Rowl (stating it is permissible to copy facts
"from a prior author's work"); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984);
Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984),
afrd, 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
96. Patry, Copyright in Compilation of Facts (Or Why the 'White Pages' Are Not
Copyrightable), 12 COMM. &: LAw 37 (Dec. 1990).
97. Id. at 64.
98. Yen, supra note 27, at 517 n.1.
99. Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1713.
100. Lacey, supra note 30, at 1547 n.73.
101. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296-97. The Court stated: "[wle note in passing... Rural
did not truly 'select' to publish the names and telephone numbers of its subscribers;
rather it was required to do so by the Kansas Corporation Commission as part of its
. monopoly franchise."Id.
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Court seems to hint that, by virtue of its monopoly
public utility, Rural Telephone Company merely
the listing information to come to it, and was
include all of this material in its directory.

Facts have never been copyrightable,102 and therefore Feist
should have come as no surprise. The First Amendment mandates copyright's idea/expression dichotomy, which ensures
copyright law will not restrict freedom of speech by protecting
ideas. 103 The "sweat of the brow" theory was merely used to put
the round peg of copyright into the square hole of protection for
labor.
The Court's decision was unanimous. 104 In Feist, the Court
insists it has merely stated the law as it has always been.
Certainly, if the Court were suddenly announcing new law, one
would expect to see either an opinion which somehow reflected that fact, or dissenting opinions. There are no such indica- .
tions in Feist. The Court's clear unified stance should create
certainty and uniformity.
Additionally, the Court's decision leads to many practical
results demonstrating its propriety. These practical implications follow.

A.

PRACTITIONER FEARS AND FEIST'S IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER
DATABASES

Before turning to implications for other databases, a brief
discussion of what comprises a database is in order. Briefly, a
database is any compilation of information arranged in a useful fashion. This includes ordinary printed library card catalogues indexed on three-by-five cards, as well as sophisticated
compilations designed for computer use such as LEXIS. Feist
involved a database, since the directory was a compilation of
subscriber information arranged alphabetically.
Practitioner fears that Feist means a loss of income from or
protection to most databases is unfounded. This is so because:
102. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 ("[tlhe public interest in the free flow of information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts").
103. Id. at 556.
104. Justice Blackmun concurred in the jUdgment. but did not write a separate
opinion.
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1) arrangement, coordination and selection provide copyright
protection; 2) databases are protected from wholesale copying
and reshuffling; and 3) telephone utilities, in particular, have
built-in assurances that licensing agreements will not end.

1. Arrangement, Coordination and Selection Provide
Copyright Protection
Some practitioners believe that databases are now vulnerable to copyright protection attacks because selection may
be lacking when all available information is included on an individual topic. l06 However, these fears fail to recognize that copyright can also be based on arrangement and coordination.
Even if a database does include an entire universe of information, it is likely to be arranged and coordinated in such a way
as to meet the low test of originality. 106 Additionally, an argument can be made that the decision to include an entire universe of information is itself selection. Such selection expresses
the judgment that all data is useful in a particular application,
and should therefore be included. l07 This argument is likely
viable despite Rural Telephone Company's inclusion of its
entire universe of information and subsequent failure to satisfy originality in selection in Feist. This is because of the
Court's hint in dicta that selection was imposed on Rural
Telephone Company by reason of its status as a public utility,
rather than Rural Telephone Company originating its selection.

2. Databases are Protected From Wholesale Copying and
Reshuffling
Some practitioners fear that copyright protection based on
originality in selection, arrangement or coordination is insufficient to prevent databases from wholesale copying and reshuffling, even if the requisite originality is present. lOS It is true that
regardless of originality, facts have always been subject to
copying. l09 However, copyright protection is available for formats of factual compilations. For example, yellow pages
105. Celedonia, Feist v. Rural Telephone: Is the Sky Falling for Directory
Publishers?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1991, at 28, col. 5.
106. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296-97. (The Court in Feist defined originality as not
being "mechanical" or "inevitable").
107. Celedonia, supra note 105, at 28, col. 5.
108. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 14, at 54.
109. Celedonia, supra note 105 at 4, col. 4.
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compiled on a software disc are still likely to receive considerable protection from wholesale copying and reshuflling. In the
recent case of Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v.
DonneUey Information Publishing, Inc.,l1O the court found,
relying on Feist, that "yellow" pages were sufficiently original
in their selection, coordination and arrangement to be copyrightable. 1l1 Furthermore, the court found that for copyright
purposes, a work is "fixed in a tangible form" if the information
has been stored on magnetic tape. Additionally, any keying of
this formatted information into a computer and storing it,
regardless of an intent to subsequently reshuffle it to create a
"new" work, amounts to copyright infringement of the format. 112 This provides copyright protection to yellow pages, by
recognizing that simply keying the copyrighted format into a
computer and storing it in any fashion results in copying.
Thus, misappropriation is prevented because taking and
rearranging unprotected information results in copyright
infringement of the arrangement. Once the copyrighted format
has been copied and stored, the infringement is complete.
Because any misappropriation would necessarily require that
one first copy and then change the format, this provides substantial protection.

3. Telephone Utilities have Built-In Protection from Loss of
Licensing Revenues
Telephone companies traditionally enter into agreements
licensing use of their subscriber information, rather than selling it to competitors. Some telephone utilities believe the Feist
decision will lead to fewer or no licensing agreements between
themselves and competing book publishers, resulting in a loss
of revenue that will ultimately be made up by ratepayers. 113 In
reality, utilities have built-in protection from such loss of revenues.
110. 933 F.2d 952 (l1th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Donnelley].
111. [d. at 958. Compare Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley
Information Publishing Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991) with Key Publications, Inc.
v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
yellow-page phone directory listings can be copied as long as the material is organized
in a different manner by the copier; so long as this "copying" does not involve keying
formatted information from magnetic tape into a computer, this decision is consistent
with Donnelley).
112. [d.
113. Communications Daily, Mar. 28, 1991, at 6 (quoting Marie Guillory of
Nat'l Tel. Coop. Assoc.: "[I]fduplicated white pages cut into revenue of Yellow Pages,
which supports basic rates, then ratepayers could be harmed.")
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It is Unlikely Licensing Agreements will be Lost

The Court's decision in Feist is not seen as a major setback
by many telephone utilities. 114 This is so because it is doubtful
that white page competitors will completely abandon license
agreements. The utilities are the first source of current information regarding customer changes in service and information,
including new connects and disconnects.1I6 This means that if
a publisher desires the most current and therefore most accurate information, a licensing agreement is still the only way to
obtain this information from the utility. This is so because
the printed copies of a utility's book are about six weeks out of
, date the day they are published, so that an independent publisher who relies on them will ultimately publish a book whose
information is months out of date. 116 Realistically then, independent publishers of white pages will still most likely find it
necessary to enter into license agreements with utilities. This
assumes independent publishers are interested in competing
in the market.

(1) Even Assuming Loss of Licensing Agreements,
Ratepayers are not Necessarily Disadvantaged
Even if licensing agreements were no longer entered into
between utilities and independent publishers resulting in
higher utility rates, since competing directories would be saving licensing costs, it is likely this would be reflected in lower
advertisement rates to yellow pages advertisers in independent
directories. This would in turn mean that, in order to remain
competitive, utility yellow page directories could not continue
to charge as much for their advertisements.
Ultimately it seems likely that these cost savings to various businesses and retailers who advertise in the directories
would in turn be passed on to the ultimate consumers, who are
114. [d. (quoting spokesperson for Bell Atlantic: "[Feist] does not affect our business dealings with any of our independent directory dealers.")
115. See, e.g., Celedonia, supra note 105, at 28, col. 5 (stating: "[i]t is this 'value
added' -- the currency of the information -- which the various telephone companies can
continue to license"); Moses, Publishers Move to Prevent Directories From Becoming
Open Books for Rivals, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1991, at B4, col. 6 (quoting Russell
Perkins, publisher of a directory-industry newsletter, stating: "Information ages ... and
they can only steal it from you once.")
116. Celedonia, supra note 105, at 29 n.24, col. 2.
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also the ratepayers. Therefore, consumers are beneficiaries of
the Feist decision whether or not rates rise.

B.

ALTERNATIVE PROTECTIONS FOR FACTUAL COMPILATIONS

While the decision in Feist makes it clear that facts are not
copyrightable, there are ample protections available to compilations when necessary.

1. Copyright Protection zs Not Appropriate zn All
Circumstances
Not all fact-based compilations are contemplated for copyright protection.117 Clearly, the language of both the
Constitution and copyright legislation do not comprehend
copyright protection for mere facts. 118
This is as it should be. The Constitutional purpose of copyright is "to encourage the widest possible production and dissemination of literary, musical and artistic works. "119
Concomitantly, the First Amendment demands that factual
expression not be restricted by copyright.120
The altruistic principle which dictates the moral sharing
of individual accomplishments in order to promote the public
welfare would wither under a scheme extending copyright
protection to facts. As previously noted, protection of facts
was "the most glaring flaw" of the "sweat of the brow" theory.121

2. Ample Alternative Protections Exist Where Copyright is Not
Appropriate
To the extent the courts find it advantageous to grant protection to non-copyrightable works, this may be accomplished
117. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297.
118. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1988) states, in part: "In no case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states, in part, that Congress has the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984) (interpreting the Constitutional grant of power as primarily designed to evolve new works,
not compensate authors).
119. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRiNCIPLES, LAw AND PRACTICE, § 1.2, at 11 (1989).
120. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
121. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1291.
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through a variety of alternative theories. These include unfair
competition,122 contract and trade secret law,123 and restitution. 124
In Feist, the Court suggests that "'[p]rotection for the fruits
of.. .research ... may in certain circumstances be available under
a theory of unfair competition.'"125
One copyright practitioner suggests the use of contract
and trade secret law. 126 Recently, one theorist has posited that
not only is restitution law available for protection of noncopyrightable works, but that it has previously been used for
this purpose. 127
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court's decision in Feist has created no new law,
but merely clarified it by holding that the "sweat of the brow"
theory was never capable of meeting the Constitutionally
mandated originality requirement. The decision was narrow,
and perhaps in some ways limited due to Rural Telephone
Company's status as a public utility.
The decision in Donnelley suggests that substantial protection is available because formats are copyrightable. This
includes various fact-based databases.
To the extent non-copyrightabl,e materials should be provided protection, there are alternative theories available such
as unfair competition, contract and trade secret law, and
restitution.
Finally, the higher moral purpose of individual sharing
for the public good is promoted because others now have access
122. Id. at 1292 (quoting M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.04,
at 3-23 (1990)).
123. Celedonia, supra note 105, at 28, col. 6.
124. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1455 (1989).
125. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1292 (quoting M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 3.04, at 3-23 (1990)).
126. Celedonia, supra note 105, at 28, col. 6.
127. Gordon, supra note 124, at 1455 n.490 (suggesting that the Supreme Court's
protection to non-copyrightable works on a "quasi-property" theory was a device
meant to be used in reaching fair results where allowing use of another's labor seems
unfair, in International News Servo V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918».
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to compiled factual infonnation on which new ideas can be built
without fear of copyright infringement. That the Court has seen
fit to inject altruistic principles into this area of copyright
law should be welcomed. 128
Sherrie Callis*

128. Kennedy notes that, "the judge ... is at work on the indispensable task ofimagining an altruistic order.... It seems to me that we should be grateful for this much, and
wish the enterprise what success is possible short of the overcoming of its contradictions." Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1778.
* Golden Gate University School of Law Class of 1992.
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